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Abstract
Owing to the difference between the status quo utility levels of a good agent and a bad agent,
we find that a firm adopting a non-verifiable imperfect informative binary signal does not
necessarily change its action (on trading off output efficiency against rent extraction). Hence,
the signal does not always create a strictly positive value for the firm.
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Riordan and Sappington (1988) indicate that, under mild assumptions, the adoption of 
an ex post verifiable signal does not cause the agent to receive excess rent whatever 
his type is, and that the complete information optimal output levels can be 
implemented.  Hence, the ex post verifiable signal does create a strictly positive 
value for the firm whenever the second-best contract - for the case whereby the signal 
is not adopted - entails some output distortion and/or some excess information rent(s) 
given up for some type(s).
1
On this basis we wonder, without considering the costs of signal acquisition, 
whether an (ex ante) non-verifiable imperfect informative binary signal always creates 
a strictly positive value for a firm under asymmetric information.  This paper 
proposes a contractual game to analyze such an issue.  Owing to the difference 
between the status quo utility levels of a good agent and a bad agent, we find that a 
firm adopting a non-verifiable imperfect informative binary signal does not 
necessarily change its action (on trading off output efficiency against rent extraction).   
Hence, the signal does not always create a strictly positive value for the firm.  
Furthermore, if the binary signal σ  (defined in Section 2) contains a higher 
probability for the occurrence of a good agent, then the chance is less likely that the 
signal  σ   creates no strictly positive value. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
information structure of the binary signal and the model of a firm’s contracting 
problem. Section 3 analyzes the main finding that is alluded to above. The conclusion 





Consider a firm (the principal) that wants to delegate an agent to produce   units  of 
a certain product.    The value of the product to the principal is characterized by  , 




' > S 0
" < S 0 ) 0 ( = S .    The agent’s production cost is  q q C θ θ = ) , ( , 
where  θ  is a constant marginal cost that is observed by the agent, but which is 
unobservable to the firm.  Nonetheless, it is common knowledge that the cost 
function is either:     
 
            q q C θ θ = ) , (    with  probability ν                           ( 1 )  
or 
            q q C θ θ = ) , (    with  probability  ν − 1 .                        ( 2 )  
 
Here,  θ θ < .   
We define here the low cost (high cost) agent as the good (bad) agent, and we 
denote by  θ θ θ − = ∆ 0 >   the spread of uncertainty on the agent’s marginal cost.    If 
the firm pays t for producing   units of the good, then the good (bad) agent’s 
benefit is 
q
q t U θ − =  ( ) q t U θ − = , and the firm’s profit is  t q S − ≡ ) ( π .  For 
simplicity, we normalize the status quo utility of the high cost agent ( ) θ  to zero and 
                                                 
1 Cremer and McLean (1998) generalize this idea by considering correlated information in their 
multi-agent model.   
2 We draw heavily on the model used in Laffont and Martimort (2004). 
  1assume that the status quo utility level of the low cost agent (θ ) is  .    0 0 ≥ U
Before proposing a contract to the agent, the firm first decides whether to adopt an 
imperfect non-verifiable binary signal σ  about θ .  The signal takes two possible 
values:   g σ  and  b σ .  Suppose that the conditional probabilities of the realizations 
of  g σ  and  b σ  are  2 / 1 ) / Pr( ≥ = = = θ θ σ σ µ g g  and  1 ) / Pr( = = = = θ θ σ σ µ b b , 
respectively.  Note that, for any binary signal   with   and  <1, the 
firm’s profit of adopting the signal is weakly less than that under the situation 
whereby the available signal is 
' σ g g µ µ =
' '
b µ
σ .  Therefore, one will only focus on the case of 
adopting signals of this kind, such as  σ . 
Given that the signal is adopted, the firm applies Bayes law to compute the 
posterior belief of dealing with a good  agent,  namely:          
 
            = = = = ) / Pr( g g σ σ θ θ ν





1 = ,                ( 3 )  
            = = = = ) / Pr( b b σ σ θ θ ν
b g
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µ ν µ ν
µ ν




ν < .               ( 4 )  
 
3.  The  optimal  contracts: 
 
In the case of complete information, the efficient production levels 
* q  and 
*
q  are 
given by the following first-order conditions: 
 
            θ = ) ( '
* q S                                               ( 5 )  
and  
            . ) ( '
*
θ = q S                                               ( 6 )   
   
Under the situation of asymmetric information, the firm - without observing the 
type of agent it confronts - offers a menu of contracts  )} , ( ); , {( q t q t  (on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis) in order to maximize its expected profit.       
 
3.1    The case where the signal is not adopted: 
 
Define the information rents by  q t U θ − =  and  q t U θ − = .  We now replace the 
payments in the firm’s objective function as functions of information rents and 
outputs so that the new optimal variables are  )} , ( ), , {( q U q U .  The firm solves the 
following optimization problem ( ) and obtains the optimal profit  n P n π : 
( ) :        n P
)} , ( ); , {(
max
q U q U
  ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) ( )( 1 ( ) ) ( ( U U q q S q q S ν ν θ ν θ ν − + − − − + −  
            s u b j e c t   t o  
             q U U θ ∆ + ≥    (IC )                                   ( 7 )  
             q U U θ ∆ − ≥    (IC )                                   ( 8 )  
             0 U U ≥         (IR)                                   ( 9 )  
  2             0 ≥ U .          (IR )                                   ( 1 0 )  
 
   Depending on the value of  , the solution to problem ( ) falls into one of the 
following five different regimes (R1-R5).  These regimes (characterized by the 
binding constraints in (7) through (10)) are as follows. 
0 U n P
  
R 1     (IC )(IR )             b i n d i n g  
       R 2     (IC )(IR )(IR)        binding 
       R 3         (IR )(IR)        binding 
       R 4         (IR )(IR)(IC )    binding 
       R 5             (IR)(IC )    binding. 
 
Proposition 1 states all the complete results.  In what follows we index the 
solution to the problem with a superscript “ ” and define  SB
* SB
q and 
CI q  by the 
following equations, respectively:   










q S                                  ( 1 1 )  
and 
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q U q θ θ ∆ ≥ ≥ ∆ ,  0
0 * , , U U
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* q U q θ θ ∆ > > ∆ ,  0
* * , , U U q q q q





0 q U q
CI θ θ ∆ ≥ ≥ ∆ ,  0
* 0 , , U U q q
U
q








CI q U θ ∆ > 0 ,  0
*
, , U U q q q q
SB SB CI SB = = =  and  0 0 > ∆ − =
CI SB
q U U θ . 
 
We note that, even though the firm is ready to accept some distortion away from 
efficiency in order to reduce the agent’s information rent, this incurs no output 
distortion and no excess information rent received by any agent in regime R3.  
Therefore, there is no reason for the firm to adopt the signal when the condition  
*
0
* q U q θ θ ∆ > > ∆  holds.  In other regimes, each optimal second-best menu of 
contracts entails output distortions and/or excess information rent given up.  In the 
following, we will answer whether the binary signal always creates a strictly positive 
value in these regimes.     
 
3.2    The case where the signal is adopted: 
 
Suppose that the binary signal is adopted.  If  g σ σ = , then the firm selects the 
  3complete information contract 
* q q =  and  0 U U =  (since the firm is completely 
informed).  The firm’s profit, denoted by  g π , is  0
* *) ( U q q S − −θ .  If  b σ σ = , 
then the conditional probability of dealing with a good agent is  b ν  (given by (4)).  
The firm now solves the following optimization problem ( ). 
 
() :        
b P
b P
)} , ( ); , {(
max
q U q U
  ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) ( )( 1 ( ) ) ( ( U U q q S q q S b b b b ν ν θ ν θ ν − + − − − + −  
              s u b j e c t   t o    ( 7 ) - ( 1 0 ) .  
 
We next denote the firm’s optimal profit by  b π .  Note that the structures of the 
solutions to problem ( ) and problem ( ) are the same.  Proposition 2 below 
states all the complete results.  Define 





q ν  and  ) ( b






































q q ≥ ν , 
CI
b
CI q q ≥ ) (ν , and the expected profit of adopting the 
binary signal is:     
 
b g g g a π ν ν ν π νν π )) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( − + − + = .                        ( 1 5 )  
 
Proposition 2:    (For the proof, see Laffont and Martimort (2002), pp 101-104.) 









SB SB SB q U q q q q ν θ ν ∆ = = = , and  0 =
SB
U . 






q U q ν θ θ ∆ ≥ ≥ ∆ ,  0
0 * , , U U
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* q U q θ θ ∆ > > ∆ ,  0
* * , , U U q q q q





0 ) ( q U q b
CI θ ν θ ∆ ≥ ≥ ∆ ,  0
* 0 , , U U q q
U
q




, and  0 =
SB
U . 
r5. If  ) ( 0 b
CI q U ν θ ∆ > ,  0
*
, ), ( U U q q q q
SB SB
b
CI SB = = = ν , and 
0 ) ( 0 > ∆ − = b
CI SB
q U U ν θ . 
 
3.3    The binary signal does not always create a strictly positive value: 
 
By Propositions 1 and 2, if  ), , ( )) ( , 0 [
* *
0 ∞ ∆ ∪ ∆ ∈ q q U b
SB
θ ν θ  then the firm’s profit 
is strictly larger when the signal is adopted rather than when it is not adopted (i.e. 
n a π π > ).  If  ], , [
* *
0 q q U θ θ ∆ ∆ ∈  then the second-best contract without adopting 
  4the signal entails no output distortion and no excess information rent given up.  




) ( q U q b
SB
θ ν θ ∆ ≤ ≤ ∆ . 
 




) ( q U q b
SB
θ ν θ ∆ ≤ ≤ ∆ , the binary signal σ  creates no 
strictly positive value for the firm, although the second-best contract for the case 
whereby the signal is not adopted entails some output distortion for the bad type agent 
in this region. 
 
It is easy to see that, while   falls into the interval, the expected profits of 
adopting and not adopting the binary signal are the same, i.e. 
0 U
a π = n π .  The reasons 
are as follows.  First, if the signal is not adopted, then the optimal second-best 
contract entails no output distortion and no excess information rent received by the 
good type.  Hence, if the signal is adopted and  g σ σ = , then the signal does not 
entail any additional value.  Second, for the case where the signal is adopted and 
b σ σ = , the firm knows ex post that the probability of confronting a good agent is 
lower, and hence the fear of giving up information rent for the good agent is 
accordingly lower.  However, the information rent obtained in the optimal 
second-best contract corresponding to regime r1 is not high enough to induce 
participation of the good agent.    This prompts the firm (that adopts the signal) to take 
the same action (as when the signal is not adopted) in order to trade off output 
efficiency against rent extraction. 
Note that for any signal   with   and  <1, the firm’s profit of 
adopting the signal is always weakly less than the profit for the case where the signal 
is 
' σ g g µ µ =
' '
b µ
σ .  It is quite clear that the signal   does not always create a strictly positive 
value for the firm either.  Moreover, it is easy to see that any binary signal does 
create a strictly (more or less) positive value if there is no difference between both 
types’ status quo utility levels. 
' σ
We interpret  g µ   here as an index for the informativeness of a signal of this kind, 





q ν   turns closer to the first-best output level 
*
q by (13), and hence the length of 




θ θ ∆ ∆   gets shorter.  This observation is recorded as 
Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4:  The higher  g µ  is, the less often the binary signal σ  creates no 
strictly positive value. 
 
4.  Conclusion: 
 
We propose a contractual game to analyze whether an (ex ante) non-verifiable 
imperfect informative binary signal always create a strictly positive value for a firm 
under asymmetric information.  Owing to the difference between the status quo 
utility levels of a good agent and a bad agent, we find that a firm adopting a 
non-verifiable imperfect informative binary signal does not necessarily change its 
action (on trading off output efficiency against rent extraction), and hence the signal 
does not always create a strictly positive value for the firm.  Furthermore, if the 
  5binary signal σ  contains a higher probability for the occurrence of a good agent, 
then the chance is less likely that the signal  σ   creates no strictly positive value. 
Our work differs from Riordan and Sappington (1988)’s well-known result about 
the ex post verifiable signal which asserts that, under mild assumptions, the agent 
receives no excess rent whatever his type is, and that the complete information 
optimal output levels can be implemented.    Hence, the ex post verifiable signal does 
create a strictly positive value for the firm whenever the second-best contract - for the 
case when the signal is not adopted - entails some output distortion and/or some 
excess information rent(s) given up for some type(s).  An ongoing investigation is 
aimed at discerning the impacts of various improvements in a firm’s more general 
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